This article analyses the evolving relations between the military and political power in Portugal, from the time of the 19 th century liberal monarchy until the end of the 20 th century. In particular, it offers an interpretation of the impact of the diffusion of constitutionalist, republican, nationalist and socialist ideologies on military culture, and the norms guiding the attitudes and actions of military elites within the political arena. It takes into account their professional experience of war (the African campaigns, the First World War and the colonial war of 1961-74) and the observed behaviour of the working classes recruited for these missions, in the context of the policies adopted by successive governments and political regimes. The international context is also considered, both with regard to dominant ideologies and established strategic interests.
Introduction

Ca ilho s o k of
amply demonstrated that the evolution of the social composition of the officer corps had a bearing on their relationship with the Portuguese context in specific eras (1910, 1926 and 1974) . However, the same cannot be said of the prevailing political ideologies in each of these periods, despite the important contribution by Ferreira (1992) . This is, therefore, the aim of this text: to attempt to examine the main outlines of the way in which, at the dawn of the 20 th century, Republicanism affected the officer corps trained under the constitutional monarchy; how, a few years later, a new movement based on authoritarian and anti-liberal ideas was able to mobilise a large portion of the military cadres to i g a out a etu to o de ; and how, after the experience of a prolonged war in the overseas territories, which was low intensity but employed subversive methods, the next generation of professional soldiers used their arms to bring down the ruling regime and many of them were tempted by various forms of allegiance to revolutionary socialist projects. This exercise will obviously involve skimming over Matos s (2008) of the phenomena analysed by Matos, hose o e is ith the i flue e of the a o politics. However, the background also includes general reference works on the relations between the army, civil society and the state (Huntington, 1957) , the sociology of war (Bouthoul, 1970; Keegan, 1976) and the imperial designs of the great powers (Kennedy, 1987) .
What follows is an interpretative historical and political overview of the social attitudes of professional soldiers during the 20 th century, which should help formulate consistent hypotheses for the motives that led them, on occasion, to intervene directly (or attempt to do so) in the political arena th ough oups d tat, with the intention of altering the course of the government or the nature of the ruling regime. Although this overview refers concretely to the case of Portugal, it is not entirely specific to this country and its main lines of analysis correspond to general trends observable in other scenarios in the same periods, hence the inclusion of some comparative observations relating to situations in other countries (see, for instance, Girardet, 1964 , for the case of France). It also refers, in general terms, to soldiers, but the intention is essentially to restrict this term to the body of professionals who choose a career in the armed forces and are the main repositories of military values and culture, historical memory and traditions. Additionally, they are the main reserve for the authority and intelligence that organise all operational units and that provide the rationale for the a tio s u de take the atio s a ed fo es. In other words, the main reference point here is the officer corps (those with fundamental responsibilities for commanding troops and the corresponding prerogatives), rather than the sergeants and ordinary soldiers, despite the fact that these subordinate ranks exist in much larger numbers. The text refers primarily to the army, as the larger and more influential branch of the armed forces, leaving slightly to one side aspects which are different and specific to the navy -the subject of a study by Freire (2003) -and the air force (still awaiting in-depth studies from a social sciences and humanities perspective, in Portugal at least), in order to focus on what they essentially share with their comrades in the ground forces: the military spirit.
In effect, the current idea of the armed forces as an integrated structure with three branches that essentially ensures national defence is relatively recent in origin, dating from the Second World War and the beginning of U.S. dominance. Before this, they were referred to as la d a d sea fo es, supe ised fo a lo g ti e, at the level of government structure, by the War and Navy Ministries, respectively. It should, however, be noted that even in a country with an overseas empire such as the one that Portugal possessed in the first half of the 19 th century, the institutional framework for the defence of Portuguese sovereignty in such faraway places was never entirely satisfactorily resolved, bearing in mind the means of communication at the time. However, the location of the various theatres of operations and, without doubt, also the influences of the most powerful endogenous interests generally led to associating the a ith the e te al a tio s of the state a a d diplo a , hilst a a d o e seas affai s were managed jointly (Barata & Teixeira, 2003; Telo, 1999) .
Nineteenth-century constitutionalism and the end of the monarchy
The experience of the civil war fought between the supporters of D. Pedro and D. Miguel -in the turbulent times following the French invasions, the withdrawal of the court to Brazil, the presence of the English and the first episodes in the Liberal revolution -must have been traumatic for many and, to a great extent, determined the profound reorganisation of the state which took place in the 1830s. From that time until almost the end of the 19 th century, continental Portugal was no longer under threat and the armed forces were only used occasionally to repress domestic reactions to unpopular measures which were part of the plans to modernize the country the Patuleia, o little i il a , a d peasa t uprisings) and to settle differences between opposing factions or figures from the dominant political elite (Cabralism, the Marechais, etc.). Essentially, these were cases of resistance on the part of the socio-cultural survivors of the Old Regime, fa ed ith the a i al of p og ess a gi g f o the free press to the railways) and the emergence of a bourgeois civilization in which wealth no longer depended exclusively on birth and the church was no longer (almost entirely)
indistinguishable from the state. It should be noted that, with an essentially urban concept of the police dispersed on the streets dealing with vagrancy, soldiers were still responsible to a large extent for maintaining law and order in the territory, a duty which they exercised elegantly clad in breeches, short jacket and shako with plumes.
In these circumstances, the armed forces were experiencing the difficult transition from the former principle of personal loyalty to the monarch -to which may be added the near monopoly of the court aristocracy over the senior command, as Monteiro (2007) has clearly shown, despite recourse to foreign commanders and soldiers, paid at the going rate -and the new requirement of loyalty and service to the nation (Valente, 1997; Marques, 1999) . As the nation was an abstract concept (although materialised in the form of territory and heritage, the population and shared language, in addition to religion), there was a need to make use of a combination of institutions to represent it and to find and define, tant bien que mal, a place on which the dependence and subordination of the military corps to decisions could be anchored: the ministry, the constitution, the king, parliament or the courts of law.
In addition, during this period the main organisational and functional pillars of the modern military institution were reformed and consolidated, involving:
 Training for the officer corps in specialist schools and the organisation of their professional careers on a functional and meritocratic basis;
 (Freire, 2009 and 2010) .
At the same time, the most outstanding members of this elite quickly discovered unsuspected vocations as public administrators (in the new colonial administration installed in the territory after conquering the tribes and indigenous peoples) and various others were moved by scientific curiosity to explore and acquire detailed knowledge of the territories, their resources and populations. The official reports from the military campaigns and colonial government of the time were full of curious information about local history and culture, as well as references to prospects fo the e o o i de elop e t of futu e B azils. At the same time, they took note of the incipient urban life in the small towns and cities where whites, natives and foreigners laboured, the random allegiances or submission of the indigenous authorities to the Portuguese flag (with the payment of the respective tax on huts), the violent incidents and acts that took place here and there, and the establishment of outposts i itiall ilita a d late ad i ist ati e to o t ol vast territories, which were g aduall li ked teleg aph li es a d oads ope ed afte e uisitio i g la ou e s al eit paid , a aged the Po tuguese. F o these fe illia t a d onsoling pages in the histo of o te po a Po tugal as Mouzi ho de ál u ue ue ote 1 ), these men took the material needed to reinforce the model of the military hero, entirely and exclusively dedicated to serving his country, who was content simply to know he had done his duty and to receive some form of symbolic recognition from the country, such as decorations, tributes to the dead or, best of all, a place amongst the great names of Portugal.
The hesitatio s of these e f o the s hool of Mouzi ho -the history of Paiva Couceiro, mordantly characterized by Valente (2006) , is a case in point -in the face of the subtleties and traps of state politics meant that the dizzying developments that took place at the beginning of the 20 th century -such as the working-class socialist movement, the women s suff age o e e t or the aesthetic revolution in music or painting -passed this generation by, since they were powerless to control them and incapable of understanding them. However, the African experience had a profound effect on the memory of the ge e atio s that follo ed a d a ed the ith a is e al dist ust of the s i e, politi s to quote Bordallo).
Moreover, during this period the process of social sealing of the officer corps, with descendants following the same vocation and reinforced family connections, was consolidated, meaning that authentic military lineages were created. If the aristocratic elitism of the officer class gradually disappeared, the entry of the best sons of the middle class and petty bourgeoisie (and more rarely the working class) into this group compensated for this with the advantages offered by a more substantial technical training (Carrilho, 1985) .
The spread of Republicanism
The rapid and even overwhelming way in which, within around twenty years, Republicanism spread in Portugal amongst a significant portion of the urban bourgeoisie and acquired enthusiastic supporters amongst the Lisbon intellectuals, many shopkeepers and artisans and even the hoi polloi i working-class neighbourhoods and in the barracks is perhaps still surprising. The best-known and most consistent historiography has long ago identified the causes, described how it took place and discussed the consequences (Marques, 1977; Wheeler, 1978; Ramos, 1994 ). An example of the latter was the fact that, as it began later, it occupied the ground where working-class socialism was already developing, thus blocking the development of a central European type of social democracy and facilitating the course of the revolutionary syndicalist alternative. But it may be considered that the success of the 'epu li a ideolog a d politi al o e e t had a lot to do ith the deg ee of otte ess of the monarchy as an institution -that is to say, its inability to respond to the cultural challenges of the age, an area in which, in addition to the political class, the substantial influence of the Catholic church, still closely linked to power, weighed heavily -and, on a deeper level, with the intensification of the demagogic populist wave that had already swept through the country in 1820 (Valente, 1974; Cabral, 1979) .
What is certain is that the Republican idea also won over many soldiers after the i su e tio of hi h has ee alled the sargentada [se gea ts evolt]), and also seeped through to the officer ranks, with motive and method. The motive was again Moreover, the everyday use of firearms meant that certain conscripts felt more ready to use them for their own purposes once they returned from the snow- Farinha (1998) . In these various cases, armed civilians almost always played a part (non-mercenary volunteers, it should be noted) fighting alongside the military units in revolt, which conveys the impression of how normal violence was during this period (to which the bombers and civilian militias added in their own way 5 ).
Far more serious, however, was the responsibility of these insurrectionary officers, since they were seriously violating their duties as the armed wing of the nation (to defend it against attacks from abroad) and illegitimately forcing their subordinates to support their beliefs.
In addition, since political participation was a Republican right that did not exclude soldiers, countless army and navy officers joined the ranks of the governments of the 1 st Republic, the parliament at S. Bento and the lists of party members, inevitably adding to the divisio s a d e al lashes a o g comrades. The support base of the New State contained a combination of very diverse elements and political sensibilities. The National Union party itself was seen by many as a nonpartisan demonstration of support for a regime a d a go e e t that a ted to do e e thi g fo the atio . It should not be forgotten that parliamentary democracy was heavily contested in the 1920s and 30s, both by populist and nationalist movements (in Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, etc.) and by the opposing alternatives represented by Communism and the USSR. It was therefore not surprising that some of the soldiers who assumed political duties in the New State did so to oppose the sterile partisanship and parliamentarianism of the 1 st Republic, and that others accepted posts in the state administration because they believed they were working for national resurgence.
Thus, "alaza s p og a e to etu the soldie s to the a a ks a d pa if the ou t i luded the follo i g easu es:
 A drastic reduction in the level of violence and lack of safety in society, using the necessary means; In this way -through the heritage of the 19 th century, the consolidation of the institution itself, the campaigns and expeditions in distant lands and the experiences of political intervention -the ethics and culture of the contemporary Portuguese military was forged.
The former refers to what should be, the military courts being responsible for its definition within the internal or corporative order, while the legitimate political power emanating from society is responsible for establishing its mission. The latter refers to what actually is and, from this perspective, can be examined and analysed, in particular through academic research (Freire, 2009a) .
The last of the African campaigns and the 1974 Revolution
The Po tuguese go e e t ea ted p o ptl a d effi ie tl to the out eak of su e si e a s i á gola, Gui ea a d Moza i ue -and was actually supported in this by the democratic opposition. There, soldiers were severely tested, overcoming difficulties of various types and leaving in the field proof of their loyalty and honour, with ten thousand killed and many maimed out of the approximately one million who were called up (Cann, 1997) . However, the regime was unable to survive these protracted conflicts. The persistence of the local nationalist fighters and the (relative) international isolation of Portugal were the main exhaustion factors, but the end of the wars, the consequent independence of the territories and, above all, the fall of the actual regime in Lisbon only became possible because a significant number of lower ranking officers were moved to conspire and carry out a su essful oup d tat.
During those years, the professional cadres of the army, navy and air force experienced the privations of a war without rules, for which they had not been prepared, in addition to the regular dramas involved in this kind of extreme situation. Many read Jean Lartéguy, 7 questioned their role as the centurions of the West (or the regime) and perhaps became disorientated by the ambiguous responses to their doubts. They also came into close contact with a e ge e atio of stude ts ho, as o s ipts, e e fo ed to fight o dese t … , and commanded a succession of troops who were the sons of o ke s a d peasa ts f o i e
Portugal, for whom they were the main role models -as fighters and as men (Brito, 1999 (Brito, -2001 . Whilst some committed (or allowed) atrocities and adopted other forms of fearaverting behaviour, they were all able to see and assess the behaviour of the colonialists and the authorities and the poverty of African life on the basis of their personal experience and intervention. New solidarities were forged between soldiers from different ranks and separate branches. Orders from Lisbon or any headquarters, visits by important officials or information extracted by force by the PIDE (International and State Defence Police) seemed strange and abstruse to them at times. In the meantime, in everyday life, it was common to share combat rations with a black youth, light a cigarette in the mouth of a dead soldier or make a pious gesture towards an already helpless prisoner. 8 Eventually, the large-scale o ilisatio of o s ipted offi e s a d the is ege atio of the t oops led to a more extensive occupation of the territories, and most of the actual fighting was transferred to the special forces (some of whom had been recruited locally), given them also the odiousness of the task at a time when international opinion had already been won over to the cause of independence.
This was the experience of the men responsible for the Revolution of 25 April 1974 -although there were differences with regard to the navy and the air force. Given their basic training, they were not unaware that in setting out on this path they were violating the fundamental principles of military discipline and their duty to obey the legal government of the nation. Yet they believed that they were responding to the deepest aspirations of the majority of the Portuguese people and perhaps, to a certain extent, redeeming the armed forces from their political intervention at the start of the New State and the strong support they had given it for decades. In fact, from the first hours of the uprising and throughout the entire process that followed until the national situation was normalised as a constitutional and politically free democratic regime, the main objectives of Democratisation, Decolonisation and Development were never questioned by significant sectors of the population.
However, the soldiers of the Revolution did not emerge unscathed from opening this e ita le Pa do a s Bo . Politi s -now warlike and youthful, driven by an important, diverse and revolutionary far left (Oliveira, 1993 ) -quickly entered the barracks, bases and ships, not to aise the o s ious ess of the asses, but to sow division, capture allies and isolate the adversaries of the moment, consequently paralysing the mechanisms of the chain of command and neutralising the operations of the units. In addition to the climate of freedom previously experienced in 1910, the usual demoralisation that comes at the end of a war that has not been won (although not lost either), was now felt in the ranks, increasing the prevailing level of indiscipline even more. The MFA (Armed Forces Movement) itself, which had momentarily conceived of itself as a Third World-style liberation movement (Oliveira, 1975) quickly became an arena for the confrontation of different political and military
opinions (and actions, with loyalties that went beyond the established hierarchies). Factions
said to e f o the ight the "pi olistas , the e t e-left the Melo-á tu istas , the left the Go çal istas a d the fa left the Otelistas -ot to e tio the Kaulzistas a d
other firm defenders of the deposed regime, were all caught up in the situation. To prevent bloodshed and fratricide, the important factors, amongst others, were the realism imposed by the international context, the timely reaction of Mário Soares, the military intervention of the i e, the intelligence of Álvaro Cunhal in reining in conflict and the moderating and mediating role played by some officers, not always visible to the public, aided by the shared status of o ades i a s of all ho were in disagreement with each other (Rezola, 2006) . In order to answer this question, it is necessary to briefly recall the way in which, throughout the 20 th century, the main political movements considered the role of the military in the changes they were engaged in bringing about.
Soldiers and politicians
Let us leave aside fascism and Nazism, which organized their assault on state power through In turn, the Chinese communists 13 had a very different experience in thei lo g a h to conquer the state (Gluksmann, 1969) . They introduced a dual combination of nationalist o je ti es agai st eigh ou i g i ade s a d i pe ialists, the distant exploiters of their 9 See the classic work by Jean Jaurès (1910) . 10 For technical concepts of assault on power from a Bolshevik perspective, see the 1931 book by A. Neuberg (1970) . 11 F o the ast i liog aph o this su je t a d the iole e of this i te io a hi h also had a f o t a d a ea gua d , see Freire (2008) . 12 Coronel Vasco Gonçalves was Prime Minister of Portugal from 18 July 1974 to 19 September 1975 resources) with socialist-Marxist-Leninist objectives for the state control of the economy and the dictatorship of the party of the proletariat, on the one hand, and forms of conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare, on the other hand. Their o ept of a people s a did ot essentially differ from the one invented by the Bolshevists in 1919, and it may be summarised thus: the regular troops were deployed in defence and conquest, whilst the rural or urban guerrillas provided the offensive, even when disadvantaged by lack of resources, and always under the control of the political commissars.
14 This was the model which, in general, was copied by the Latin American guerrillas 15 and to a great extent in the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, of which Portugal and its former overseas provinces had such a bitter experience (Afonso e Gomes, 1998) . It can also be understood how, in other situations, nationalist soldiers who felt they had received little recognition from their political leaders (corrupt monarchies, puppet governments, etc.) and who were revolted by the submission of their country to the interests of foreign powers, (generous in some cases and more instrumental in others) can provide an ideological platform where they can meet, in addition to the fact that both cling to a unitary and centralist concept of power in human communities Politi s eeds st o g di e tio , the Leninists say; Whoe e gi es the o de s, e ill a the out, reply the soldiers).
On the other hand, anarchism never had any penchant or place for the military (except for dissenters or deserters), given its internationalist (anti-nationalist), pacifist (anti-war but not necessarily non-violent) and anti-militarist (considering military leaders to have an interest in and to be responsible for wars) beliefs, in addition to its individualist attitudes (which did not exclude the community, but made it very difficult for the discipline of the barracks to be accepted) (see Freire, 1988 Freire, 2007 and .
Let me offer a final comment on the soldiers of the April revolution. Their generosity and loyalty to a certain idea of the Portuguese people cannot be questioned. However, it is legitimate to examine their public behaviour and try to understand the deep-rooted reasons for it -whether pleasant or not. In this sense, it would seem that, in addition to the more obvious causes already identified and generally invoked (war fatigue, etc.), a deeper explanation for the developments that took place (from the 1960s onwards) may be found in the weakening of the normative value of military nationalism. As already noted, this had been laboriously constructed during the 19 th century, and was the basis of the heavy involvement of the troops with Republicanism and later with the Salazar regime.
This gradual denationalisation of the attitudinal references of the military developed further with the path pursued from 1974 up to the present day. Once again, it has something to do with the loss of confidence in the main state leaders (yesterday, the ageing charismatic leaders; today, the allegedly corrupt politicians) and a lot to do with the general cosmopolitanism that has emerged everywhere (with music, cinema, novels, TV, tourism,
i te atio al a iages, a d o the I te et… . It is also li ked to the ha ges o se ed Janowitz (1971) and Moskos and Wood (1988) , which supposedly tended to make them closer to efficient professionals, one step away from security specialists and two steps away from the old mercenaries.
The nation was grateful to the soldiers of the April revolution for having put an end to the New State regime, 20 given that few others would have been able to do so, at least in the way that it was done (without great violence or flashing lights), as also happened in the period of transition. But this recognition should be extended to the citizens that they also were, rather than the soldiers who, once again, had overstepped their duties, albeit this time for a good cause. The exceptional nature of this fortunate intervention should have recommended greater discretion to them and the quickest possible return to their traditional mission. Was it the political conditions of the time that made this difficult?
áfte the o alisatio of , it is pe fe tl u de sta da le that, in the context of the Cold War in which Portugal always remained a member of the western alliance against the so ialist lo , those k o as the ilita left ega to e see those in charge of the armed forces as persona non grata in matters relating to defence secrets and operational and senior decision-making posts. Knowing the solidarities that prevailed in this area, they could o l e o side ed pote tial age ts of a e e fifth olu -despite the feeling of injustice that this may have created in some. Yet, this sanitary cordon also met with strong internal opposition, both in the corporati is of the o ades i a s, and in the status claimed by/attributed to the soldiers of the April revolution.
It should be added, as a final note, that military nationalism, although weakened, is still present today, above all implicitly, thanks to the diffuse anti-Americanism within public opinion, combined internally with a proto-unionist activism as a reaction to the loss of status of the military in society and in the eyes of the state. Society has imposed substantial cultural changes, including women in the army, multiculturalism, equality, associations, etc. (Carrilho, 1998; Matos e Bacalhau, 2001; Carreiras, 2002) , whilst the state appears not to have yet 20 The beginning of the Preamble to the Constitution approved in 1976 and still in force today praises them thus: O áp il , the á ed Fo es Mo e e t, setti g the seal o the Po tuguese people's lo g resistance and interpreting its deep-seated feelings, overthrew the fascist regime. The liberation of Portugal from dictatorship, oppression and colonialism represented a revolutionary change and a historic new beginning i Po tuguese so iet .
clearly defined the mission that should now be attributed to the armed forces, wavering between concepts of defence and security and the links between national (Portuguese) and regional/global spaces (Rodrigues, 2004; Nogueira, 2005; Nogueira e Borges, 2006 
